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The feeling of a broad scheme of relations is a feeling that knows much ; the feeling of a simple quality is a feeling that knows little . But the knowing itself , whether of much or of little , has the same essence , and is as good knowing in the one case as in the other . Concept and image , thus discriminated through their objects , are consubstantial in their inward nature , as modes of feeling . The one , as particular , will no longer be held to be a relatively base sort of entity , to be taken as a matter of course , whilst the other , as universal , is celebrated as a sort of standing miracle , to be adored but not explained . Both concept and image , quâ subjective , are singular and particular . Both are moments of the stream , which come and in an instant are no more . The word universality has no meaning as applied to their psychic body or structure , which is always finite . It only has a meaning when applied to their use , import , or reference to the kind of object they may reveal . The representation , as such , of the universal object is as particular as that of an object about which we know so little that the interjection ' Ha ! ' is all it can evoke from us in the way of speech . Both should be weighed in the same scales , and have the same measure meted out to them whether of worship or of contempt . " ( Mind , ix , pp . 18 - 19 . ) [ 403 ] Hodgson , Time and Space , p . 404 . [ 404 ] Compare the admirable passage in Hodgson's Time and Space , p . 310 . [ 405 ] Philosophy of Reflection , i , 273 - 308 . [ Pg 483 ] CHAPTER XIII . DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON . It is matter of popular observation that some men have sharper senses than others , and that some have acuter minds and are able to ' split hairs ' and see two shades of meaning where the majority see but one . Locke long ago set apart the faculty of discrimination as one in which men differ individually . What he wrote is good enough to quote as an introduction to this chapter : " Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of discerning and distinguishing between the several ideas it has . It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general : unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities , it would be capable of very little knowledge ; though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now , and the mind were continually employed in thinking . On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several even very general propositions , which have passed for innate truths ; because men , overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent , impute it wholly to native uniform impressions ; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind , whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or different . But of this more hereafter ?
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