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[ 187 ] On the relation between Psychology and General Philosophy , see G . C . Robertson , ' Mind , ' vol . viii , p . 1 , and J . Ward , ibid . p . 153 ; J . Dewey ibid . vol . ix , p . 1 . [ 188 ] Compare some remarks in Mill's Logic , bk . i , chap . iii , § § 2 , 3 . [ 189 ] Logic , § 40 . [ 190 ] Psychologie , bk . ii , chap . iii , § § 1 , 2 . [ 191 ] Cours de Philosophie Positive , i , 34 - 8 . [ 192 ] Auguste Comte and Positivism , 3d edition ( 1882 ) , p . 64 . [ 193 ] Wundt says : " The first rule for utilizing inward observation consists in taking , as far as possible , experiences that are accidental , unexpected , and not intentionally brought about . . . . First it is best as far as possible to rely on Memory and not on immediate Apprehension . . . . Second , internal observation is better fitted to grasp clearly conscious states , especially voluntary mental acts : such inner processes as are obscurely conscious and involuntary will almost entirely elude it , because the effort to observe interferes with them , and because they seldom abide in memory . " ( Logik , ii , 432 . ) [ 194 ] In cases like this , where the state outlasts the act of naming it , exists before it , and recurs when it is past , we probably run little practical risk of error when we talk as if the state knew itself . The state of feeling and the state of naming the feeling are continuous , and the infallibility of such prompt introspective judgments is probably great . But even here the certainty of our knowledge ought not to be argued on the a priori ground that percipi and esse are in psychology the same . The states are really two ; the naming state and the named state are apart ; ' percipi is esse ' is not the principle that applies . [ 195 ] J . Mohr : Grundlage der Empirischen Psychologie ( Leipzig , 1882 ) , p . 47 . [ 196 ] In English we have not even the generic distinction between the - thing - thought - of and the - thought - thinking - it , which in German is expressed by the opposition between Gedachtes and Gedanke , in Latin by that between cogitatum and cogitatio . [ 197 ] Compare B . P . Bowne's Metaphysics ( 1882 ) , p . 408 . [ Pg 199 ] CHAPTER VIII . THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER THINGS . Since , for psychology , a mind is an object in a world of other objects , its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed . First of all , to its TIME - RELATIONS . Minds , as we know them , are temporary existences . Whether my mind had a being prior to the birth of my body , whether it shall have one after the latter's decease , are questions to be decided by my general philosophy or theology rather than by what we call ' scientific facts ' — I leave out the facts of so - called spiritualism , as being still in dispute . Psychology , as a natural science , confines itself to the present life , in which every mind appears yoked to a body through which its manifestations appear . In the present world , then , minds precede , succeed , and coexist with each other in the common receptacle of time , and of their collective relations to the latter nothing more can be said . The life of the individual consciousness in time seems , however , to be an interrupted one , so that the question :
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